

The Journal of Tax Research

Volume 1, Number 2 2003

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Explaining the U.S. Income Tax Compliance Continuum⁺

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Abstract

Within an economy, tax compliance behavior falls along a continuum. At one extreme are households who fully report and pay their tax obligations despite any opportunities or incentives to cheat. At the other extreme are households who undertake considerable efforts to conceal their income and repudiate their tax responsibilities. Using a micro-simulation database, we undertake a preliminary statistica

II. DATA SOURCES

The core elements of our micro-simulation data base are derived from two separate TCMP studies that were conducted for tax year 1988, one for filers and another for nonfilers. Although these data are now some 15 years old, they have the advantage of providing detailed compliance information about both filers and nonfilers for a common tax year. We recognize that the magnitude and composition of tax noncompliance are likely to have changed since these data were collected. Notwithstanding, we believe that the data remain informative about the fundamental nature of the compliance decision and the broad underlying factors associated with noncompliance.

TCMP Filer Data

The data for filers of 1988 federal income tax returns are taken from the IRS TCMP Phase III Survey. This survey contains the results of intensive line-by-line audits of a stratified random sample of approximately

these individuals broadly representative of all true nonfilers using an econometric approach that accounts for the likelihood that a household could be located on the basis of the information (prior tax returns, third-party information slips, etc.) that was available to the revenue officer at the time he began searching for the household. This approach, which we previously employed in developing the official IRS estimate of the nonfiling tax gap, is described in Internal Revenue Service (1996).⁷

Combined Sample

To develop our core data base, we merged together the detailed information (both per return and per exam) from the TCMP filer and nonfiler data files. When weighted, our combined sample of approximately 56,000 households represents an estimated population of 112.3 million, including 104.3 million filers and 9 million nonfilers. For each household, the data base allows us to identify the occupation of the primary taxpayer and assess the sources and magnitudes of noncompliance. It also includes an imputed variable meant to approximate the burden associated preparing and filing a tax return for each of the households in our sample. This variable was defined using an IRS formula for the average time burden, in hours, for an individual whose return contains a particular set of forms and schedules.⁸

III. IMPUTATION OF UNDETECTED NONCOMPLIANCE

Even intensive examinations such as those conducted under the TCMP cannot fully uncover all noncompliance that is present. Unless undetected noncompliance is accounted for, TCMP results can provide a misleading account of the degree to which different households and occupational groups comply with their tax obligations. Below, we briefly summarize the methodology we employ to impute undetected noncompliance to returns in our micro-simulation data base. Further details are provided in Erard and Ho (2003).

TCMP examinations are generally believed to be very effective in identifying improper reports of deductions, credits, and expenses. As well, examiners have relatively little difficulty uncovering noncompliance on key income items (such as wages and interest) that are reported by third parties. For all such items, we assume that any noncompliance is fully uncovered during the examination. Our imputation of undetected noncompliance is therefore restricted to the subset of income items that not subject to information reporting. To account for undetected noncompliance, we follow a procedure similar to that employed by the IRS to generate its official estimates of the individual income tax gap—the difference between the amount of income that households owe and the amount they voluntarily pay in a timely manner.

General Imputation Approach

In most cases, we follow the IRS in assuming that for every dollar of undeclared income detected without the aid of third-party information returns, there is another \$2.28 that has gone undetected by the examiner. This assumption is based on a special TCMP study conducted for tax year 1979, from which the IRS determined that examiners, on average, were able to identify only a little less than one third of undeclared income amounts when they did not have access to information returns.

Imputation of Tip Income

One major exception to this general approach for imputing undetected noncompliance is our treatment of undeclared tip income. Rather than expanding the undeclared tip income that the TCMP examiner uncovered to account for non-detection, we have

replaced the TCMP examiner figure with an independent estimate of tip underreporting by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For tax year 1988, the BEA estimated that filers reported only \$5.9 billion in tips on their returns, understating their true tip income by \$11.6 billion. In the absence of specific information on who understated this income, we identified some 4.4 million filers in our database that were likely to receive tip income on the basis of their occupation codes (waiters, barbers, hairdressers, bellhops, etc.), and we assigned each an equal share of the \$11.6 billion (approximately \$2,650 each). We employed a comparable approach to allocate \$532 million in tip income to nonfilers based on the BEA estimate for nonfilers.⁹

Imputation of Informal Supplier Income

A second major exception to our general imputation approach is our treatment of “informal suppliers.” The IRS defines “informal suppliers” as:

individuals who provide products or services through informal arrangements which frequently involve cash-related transactions or ‘off the books’ accounting practice.

(Internal Revenue Service, 1996, p. 43)

Examples include self-employed domestic workers, street-side vendors, and moonlighting tradesmen. Conceptually, the informal economy includes all types of market economic activity that are potentially under-measured in the National Accounts owing to the vendors’ informal business style (sales in cash, lack of adequate records of sales and purchases, etc.) Since the detection of noncompliance among such individuals is likely to be especially difficult, the IRS commissioned the Survey Research Center of University of Michigan to conduct some special studies during the 1980s to derive estimates the gross sales revenue earned by informal suppliers. Rather than attempt to interview the *suppliers* of goods and services in the informal economy (who might not be forthcoming about their activities), the University of Michigan researchers elected to interview the *purchasers*. Specifically, they relied on telephone

population. We assumed that all of the Schedule C (self-employment) net income reported by these households (\$9.5 billion by filers and \$9.7 billion by nonfilers) on their tax returns was attributable to informal activities. The aggregate difference between our measures of true and reported informal supplier income for each group represented our estimate of total undeclared income. In the absence of specific information about the relative levels of unde

Overall Noncompliance by Occupation

Table 1 presents our estimates of overall noncompliance by occupational category, which accounts for both nonfiling and misreporting. On net, underpayments of tax liability more than offset overpayments within each category, so that the average level of noncompliance is positive in all cases. The occupations in the table are ranked in order of the average dollar level of noncompliance. By this measure, the 5 least compliant occupations are: (1) vehicle sales; (2) investors; (3) informal suppliers; (4) lawyers and judges; and (5) doctors and dentists.

At the other end of the continuum, the 5 most compliant occupations are: (1) the “other” occupation category, which includes homemakers; (2) military; (3) administrative support; (4) retired or disabled; and (5) production/manufacturing.

As stressed in Erard and Ho (2003), however, the compliance rankings differ when noncompliance is measured in terms of the aggregate percentage of taxes unpaid rather than the average level of noncompliance. For instance, as noted above, lawyers and judges rank fourth highest in terms of the average level of noncompliance, underpaying taxes by an estimated average of \$2,273 per return. However, this represents only about 8.9 percent of their estimated overall tax liability, compared to an estimated 14.9 percent underpayment for all occupations as a whole. Similarly, doctors and dentists rank high in terms of the average estimated dollar level of noncompliance (\$2,181), but low in terms of the estimated share of their overall liability that goes unpaid (7 percent).

Conversely, certain occupational groups rank relatively low in terms of average dollars of noncompliance, but quite high in terms of the aggregate share of tax liability that goes unpaid. For instance, individuals employed in service occupations other than those associated with tip earners, informal suppliers, or protective services (“other services”) understate their taxes by an estimated \$371 – well below the mean of \$655 for the population as a whole. However, this represents some 33.1 percent of their estimated overall tax liability, which is very large relative to the average underpayment rate of 14.9 percent. Similarly, helpers and handlers (who do routine work under close supervision, such as assisting skilled workers in the construction trades, stocking grocery shelves, or packing or moving freight, cargo, or materials) are estimated to understate taxes by the relatively low amount of \$409 on average, but this represents 23.8 percent of their estimated overall tax liability.

Although the relative compliance rankings for the above occupational groups depend critically on whether noncompliance is measured in absolute or percentage terms, many groups rank consistently high or low under both types of measure. For instance, the vehicle sales group ranks highest both in terms of estimated average level of noncompliance (\$6,406) and estimated share of overall taxes not paid (51.1 percent). Other occupational groups that rank consistently high in terms of noncompliance are:

declaring income. Similarly, a household from an IRS district with a relatively high

Results for Filer Sample

Most econometric studies of tax compliance have relied solely on data for filers of tax returns. To investigate whether the exclusion of nonfilers from the sample leads to biased inferences, we have repeated our analysis of the variation in compliance by occupation using only the data from our filer sample. As summarized in Table 4, the filer sample results are qualitatively very similar to the full sample results in Table 3, although the regressor for the percentage of married taxpayers loses its statistical significance in the restricted sample. Thus, restricting attention to filers does not seem to impart much bias on inferences concerning the determinants of noncompliance.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have performed a preliminary analysis of noncompliance by occupation using a micro-simulation base that contains information on both filers and nonfilers of U.S. federal individual income tax returns. We began by deriving a map of where 34 distinct occupational groups fall along the compliance continuum. The results show that, for many occupational groups, the relative ranking depends on whether compliance is defined in absolute terms or as a share of taxes owed.

Using a grouped data regression analysis, we have explored what factors are responsible for the variation in compliance along the continuum. The results indicate that opportunity plays a key role in determining which occupations are relatively compliant and which are relatively noncompliant. More specifically, compliance tends to be substantially lower among those occupations with relatively little income subject to third party information reporting. Further, noncompliance tends to increase with the time burden associated with preparing and filing a return. This may be an indication that a large burden discourages some households from filing and drives others to report dishonestly. The time burden regressor also serves as a proxy for legal ambiguity. Therefore, the result may also be an indication that ambiguity provides savvy taxpayers and tax practitioners with an improved opportunity for noncompliance, while increasing the likelihood that less able taxpayers will make unintentional errors.

Although opportunity and burden were found to play the greatest roles in explaining the variation in compliance by occupation, the percentages of elderly individuals and married couples were also significant explanatory variables. In particular, occupations with larger shares of such individuals, other factors equal, tend to be relatively more compliant.

A comparison of the grouped data regression results based on the full sample of filers and nonfilers with those based on filers alone indicates that the exclusion of nonfilers in past empirical studies may not have imparted much bias on qualitative inferences about the determinants of noncompliance. However, it is clear from the breakdown of compliance by occupation in Table 2 that one cannot fully understand compliance among such occupational groups as informal suppliers, helpers and handlers, and other services without examining both filing and nonfiling behavior.

APPENDIX - TABLES

TABLE 1: DISTRIBUTION OF NONCOMPLIANCE BY OCCUPATION, RANKED BY ESTIMATED AVERAGE LEVEL OF NONCOMPLIANCE

Occupation	Avg. level of noncompliance	% of total taxes not paid	Group's share of population	Group's share of total tax gap
Vehicle sales	\$6,406	51.1%	0.1%	0.49%
Investors	\$4,398	15.0%	0.2%	1.38%
Informal suppliers	\$4,011	44.1%	3.0%	18.66%
Lawyers and judges	\$2,273	8.9%	0.5%	1.73%
Doctors and dentists	\$2,181	7.6%	0.5%	1.78%

-0.78

Occupation	Avg. level of noncompliance	% of total taxes not paid	Group's share of population	Group's share of total tax gap
Post-secondary teachers	\$433	6.3%	0.3%	0.19%
Other teachers, counselors, librarians	\$416	10.1%	2.1%	1.31%
Helpers and handlers	\$409	23.8%	7.1%	4.42%
Accountants, auditors, tax preparers	\$386	5.4%	1.1%	0.65%
Other health workers	\$372	10.2%	3.1%	1.74%
Other services	\$371	33.1%	4.8%	2.72%
Technologists & technicians (other than health)	\$344	6.7%	2.1%	1.10%
Protective services	\$300	7.7%	1.6%	0.73%
Production/manufacturing	\$296	9.8%	11.8%	5.34%
Retired or disabled	\$281	8.8%	7.0%	3.00%
Administrative support	\$176	8.0%	7.8%	2.11%
Military	\$131	7.4%	1.4%	0.27%
Other	\$47	8.2%	9.4%	0.67%

All occupations combined

TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF NONCOMPLIANCE BY

Occupation	Filers		Nonfilers		Filers & nonfilers combined	
	Avg. level of non-compliance	% of filer popn.	Avg. level of non-compliance	% of nonfiler popn.	Avg. level of non-compliance	% of overall popn.
Managers, consultants, public relations	\$645	2.3%	\$1,051	1.40%	\$666	2.2%
Transportation & material moving	\$538	3.0%	\$2,752	0.63%	\$577	2.8%
	\$554	2.8%	\$1,593	0.55%	\$571	2.6%

c

TABLE 3: RESULTS OF GROUPED DATA REGRESSION TO EXPLAIN VARIATION IN TOTAL NONCOMPLIANCE BY OCCUPATION;

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ENDNOTES

¹ Refer to Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) for reviews of this literature. Erard and Ho (2001) provide one of the only empirical analyses of nonfilers.

² Unfortunately, this data base is not in the public domain, because it contains sensitive individual taxpayer information that cannot be publicly disclosed.

³ The TCMP filer population excludes returns that were filed late as well as returns filed by non-resident taxpayers.

⁴ Non-residents and individuals without valid social security numbers were excluded from the analysis.

⁵ In the U.S., households with income below a specified filing threshold that varies according to age, marital, and dependency status are not required to file a federal income tax return.

⁶ Unlocated individuals in the sample tended to have much larger sample weights as a consequence of the way the sample was stratified. The sample weights for the 4,594 individuals in the sample aggregate to approximately 43 percent of the potential nonfiler population.

⁷ Our approach includes an enhancement to the original IRS approach in that we adjust the weights separately by sampling stratum to make the 2,195 returns broadly representative of all nonfilers who were located during the search process. For the 1996 tax gap report, the IRS adjusted the sample weights for all 2,195 returns by the same factor.

⁸ We employ the IRS measure of filing burden originally developed by Arthur D. Little, Inc., which is computed by aggregating the estimated average completion times associated with each form and schedule used by the taxpayer. Thus, in essence, the measure reflects a weighted number of forms and schedules, where the weights are the estimated completion times.

⁹ This estimate represents “true nonfilers”; individuals with no legal filing requirement were separately estimated to have received \$93 million in tips.

¹⁰ Our calculator ignores issues such as the Alternative Minimum Tax, but does take into account the phase-out of personal exemptions that applies to taxpayers with high levels of income.

¹¹ The principal difficulty was computing the additional self-employment tax for married joint filers. For such households, it was not possible using our data to determine what shares of additional self-employment and wage and salary income were attributable to each spouse. Nor was it possible to determine which households were entitled to use the optional method for computing self-employment taxes.

